Introduction
Uncertainty is a salient feature of most domains of expert knowledge and of . the problems to which it is applied.
Developers of rule-based expert systems have employed several different techniques to represent uncertainty and make inferences under uncertainty. We shall refer to these techniques generically as uncertain inference systems (UIS's).
Probability is by far the most extensively developed formalism for representing uncertainty. but the majority of researchers in rule-based expert systems have not found it very appealing hitherto. Instead they have developed more ad-hoc techniques, notably Certainty Factors used in Mycin (Shortliffe, 1976) , and the related approach used in Prospector (Duda et al, 1976) . Other methods in which there is current interest are Fuzzy Set Theory (Zadeh, 1984 , Kaufmann, 1975 , the belief functions of Demp::;ter-Shafer theory, Cohen's theory of endorsements, and Doyle's theory of reasoned assumptions. There is increasing debate about the relative merits and flaws of these approaches (e.g. see (Cohen et al, 1984 , Spiegelhalter, 1985 ), and the question arises of how to decide which is most appropriate for a given application.
A major difficulty in comparing them is that they make quite different fundamental assumptions about the nature of uncertainty.
Where the notion of subjective probability in Bayesian Decision Theory refers to the degree of belief in a hypothesis, Fuzzy Set theory addresses vagueness or linguistic imprecision, and Dempster-Shafer theory addresses the degree of evidential support or disconfirmation. They also have varying types of theoretical status. Probability theory is based on explicit axioms of rational choice behavior; whereas other UISs, such as Mycin's Certainty Factors, have only heuristic justification, seeming to be useful even though they have do not have a precise, operationally defined meaning.
The second set of issues in comparing UISs are pragmatic. How easy is it to implement? What kinds of knowledge structures does it imply? How easy is to elicit the expert judgments required in this form? How easy is to understand the conclusions of uncertain inferences? And not least, how much computational effort does it require?
In keeping with the pragmatism dominant in research in AI and expert systems, these issues, particularly the last. seem to have been the prime determinants so far in choice of UIS.
Researchers in AI have given more attention to qualitative issues of syrnbolic reasoning, than issues of quantification of uncertainty. Indeed there is a common perception that results are insensitive to the method of quantification employed. although we have been unable to find experimental tests of this belief. Thus a third type of question in selecting among UIS is about their performance: Does it make a significant difference in terms of the conclusions of uncertain inference which approach you use? If not. then we may continue to use the simpler methods such as in Mycin, without having to worry about the complexities of some of the other UISs. But if there are situations in which commonly used UISs produce clearly incorrect or counter-intuitive results, then at least we should be aware of these so we can avoid them. If these situations are common then perhaps we should change our choice of UIS, or identify a need to develop better methods which combine greater theoretical soundness with pragmatic ease-of-use. Until more thorough tests of the performance of current UIS's are carried out, we cannot know how much of a problem there is, and so it is hard to tell the degree of urgency. The main goal of this paper is to present a framework for making such experimental comparisons, some analysis of the behavior of selected UIS's for rule-components and some preliminary results with an example rule-set.
Formalisms for representing uncertainty
In this section we will provide an extremely brief introduction to the most popular formalisms for representing uncertainty, including probability, as used in Bayesian Decision Theory (BOT), Mycin certainty factors (Myc), Fuzzy Set Theory (FST), and Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST).
Probability
Probability is certainly the oldest and most widely used formalism for representing uncertainty, at least outside Artificial Intelligence research.
The probability of a proposition, according to Bayesian Decision Theory (BDT), is a measure of a person's degree of belief in it, given the information currently known to that person. It is defined operationally in terms of the person's willingness to take bets based on the truth of the proposition. Thus the notion of probability derives from a set of simple axioms about decision·making (Savage, 1954) . The force of these axioms, and hence of the laws of probability derived from them, arises from the fact that a people who violate them and act on "incoherent" probabilities (which, for example, do not satisfy Bayes' rule) are liable to demonstrable loss. Most famously, an opponent could always design a ' .
'Dutch book", that is a combination of bets that they would be willing to accept, according to their professed beliefs, but which in sum would result in a guaranteed loss.
It has also been shown that for any reasonable scoring rule (which rewards a decision maker based on the truth of uncertain propositions), any scalar measure of unctirtainty is either worse than probability (produces a lower score) or is equivalent to it (de Finetti, 1974) .
It is important to note that these proofs are prescriptive, not descriptive. They do not claim that people actually behave according to the tenets of BDT or use subjective probabilities, but only that they could not do better than to follow it. Indeed there is a considerable psychological literature showing that human judgment is liable to predictable biases and inconsistencies arising from the cognitive heuristics we use (Kahneman, Slavic & Tversky, 1982) . 
. Am).
A full joint probability d1stnburlon over these propositions specifies a probability for each event, and so requires specification of 2m· 1 p�rameters. (The extra parameter is taken up by the constraint that the probabilities sum to 1.) A rule such as, A & -,A __.A with probability p, has a natural interprehtio� as a conditional probability:
p(A · lA ,..., A)= p Such conditional probabilities and 3 rrfargi�al probabilities, p(A.), representing prior opinions on events, impose ' a s � t �f li � ear constraints on the joint probability d1stnbut1on over the propositions. The exponentially large number of degrees of freedom to be specified and computational effort in updating distributions when new evidence becomes available make it quite understandable that expert system research has shied away from this full probabilistic representation.
Mycin certainty factors and Fuzzy Set theory
Probably the earliest and most widely·used method for inference under uncertainty in expert systems are the Certainty Factors originally developed for Mycin (Shortliffe, 1976) and increasingly used in other systems. These were introduced as a computationally simpler alternative to subjective probabilities. They represent degree of belief in a proposition by a number between -1 and 1: 1 represents "certain truth", 0 means "no evidence", and -1 means 'lcertain falsity' .
'.
Fuzzy set theory (FST) (Kaufmann, 1975 Zadeh 1984 ) is intended to represent "fu�zy" 0�
linguistically imprecise terms, such as a "tall man", in contrast to the "crisp", well-defined events to which probability applies. For example, if T is the set of heights of "tall men" then U 1 (x) is a fuzzy membership function, with value O · for x = 48", 1 for x = 84", and some smooth, monotonic transition from 0 to 1 for heights in between, defining the "degree of membership in T" for each x. Much more on FST can be found in the literature.
·
Both Myc and FST can be used to assign . numbers to indicate uncertainty about propositions ("Bill is tall"), and to implication rules ("If Bill is tall and Bill is strong, then Bill is heavy"). They use rules of similar form to obtain strengths for conjunctions, disjunctions, and modus ponens implication. The strength of a pro�osi�ion is attenuated by the strength of the 1mpllcat1on rule to obtain the strength for the conclusion. This process may be repeated all the way along a rule proposition tree, to propagate uncertain beliefs from its leaves (data nodes) to its roots (conclusions).
Dempste r-Shafer Belief Functions
Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) is designed to handle cases where the probability distribution is incompletely known. Shafer (Shafer, 1984) gives the following illustration. We've asked Fred if the streets are icy. He replies "No", and we know that 80% of the time he speaks accurately and honestly. and 20% of the time he speaks carelessly, saying whatever comes to mind. Without a prior on the proposition "the streets are icy", or a conditional probability that Fred is correct when speaking carelessly, a naive Bayesian would be unable to produce a p�sterior � robability that the streets are icy, g1ven Fred s answer. With t1 ="the streets are A Bayesian would try to allocate the remaining .2 between t 1 and t 2 , but Shafer's point is that, if we don t have the Thus DST is a generalization of probability, which allows )ack of evidence to be represented in addition to probabilistic· belief. DST also provides methods such as Dempster's rule for combining evidence from. different sources (Shafer, 1976) .
Unfortunately, when a frame of reference S has m propositions, and n =2m basic events, there are 2n subsets in that frame. Using such a belief function could potentially be a burden that is exponentially greater than the full probabilistic representation. However, there are arguments that approximations can be used, and an important special case where a simple exact function can be used. Unfortunately the special case is a strong argument against the approximations, as we shall argue below.
Comparing UISs
To answer questions about differences in performance, a common interpretation of the inputs and results is required to make them commensurable.
Presumably, the ultimate purpose of any expert system is to lead to better decision.
If two different representations of uncertainty lead to making the same decision, then they are operationally equivalent. According to Bayesian Decision theory, decisions can reveal probabilistic beliefs about the outcomes on which the decisions are based. Even it the decision-maker doesn't actually have probabilistic beliefs, if he chooses coherently he wtll act as though he has them. So in principle, if a non-probabilistic approach to uncertainty provides an integrated theory of how to make decisions based on its· representations of uncertainty, then this would imply an operational correspondence between uncertain beliefs expressed in the probabilistic and nonprobabilistic forms, where they produced the same decision.
This would allow direct comparison of the representations.
Notably, however, the non-probabilistic approaches do not provide agreed upon decision strategies, and so this is unfortunately impossible.
Nevertheless, there are obvious, simple ways to make transformations from at least FST and Mycin to probability. For FST one can simply estimate probability by the fuzzy membership function:
This corresponds to the interpretation of f = LJ 8 (x) as "the probability that x will be classified as S, by the expert after whom the system is modelled, is f". The FST combination rules then form a quasi-probabilistic model of the expert's reasoning.
For Mycin, the conversions are taken from the · verbal definitions of Certainty Factors, m(x) (Shortliffe, 1976): 1 means tru�. so p(x) = 1, 0 means no evidence, so we assume the prior, p(x) = p'(x), and ·1 means definitely, so p(x) = 0.
We use piecewise interpolation between these three points of correspondence.
DST can be looked at as providing bounds on probability.
The belief in an event set .,. ,
a= Bel (-r ) and in its complement, b = Bei(T-1'), provide lower and upper bounds on its probability. We will derive and discuss some problems with this below.
Extra parameters and assumptions about correlations
As we mentioned, the number of parameters of a joint probability distribution over m propositions, has 2n • 1 free parameters. In general, the number of conditional probabilities, specifying rule strengths, and marginal probabilities, specifying prior beliefs, which elicited from experts, will be far few�r than the number of parameters, and hence insufficient to completely the joint distribution.
Any uncertain inference method, by implication at least, makes certain assumptions about the unspecified parameters, particularly the correlation between propositions. For example, the combination rules for Fuzzy Set Theory and for Mycin (under some conditions on the prior) are equivalent to probabilistic inference assuming maximum correlation between the propositions.
One can also use simplified probabilistic inference methods that assume minimum correlation or independence between the input propositions. For convenience we will label these assumptions, "MaxC ", "MinC", and ' "lnd" respectively. The following table gives the combination rules for calculating the probability of the conjunction and disjunction of two events, A and 8, as a function of their probabilities, p(A) and p( II), corresponding to each assumption. It also gives "probabilistic modus ponens", that is, 1'1. H), as a function of p( A), and the "rule strength" or conditional probability, p(IJIA). In the latter case, the assumptions about correlation or independence are subject. to p(I!IA). and are assumed to constrain J!{ !JI-,A). In particular MaxC (and FST) implies that pUJI--,.-1)=0, MinC implies p(RI-,A)=l, and we assume that lnd lies between them and implies J!{HI-,A>=0 . 5 .
To avoid these somewhat arbitrary assumptions Prospector (Duda et al, 1976) . allows explicit specification of this "lower strength" for each rule p(BI-,A)=O.
For maximum correlation (MaxC):
For "Independence" (lnd): 
To visualize the possible effect of this range of assumptions about the correlations we have graphed some implications of these rules in Key Uis
Figure 2: Indeed Figure 4 shows that the slopes can have different sign. FST can respond in the opposite direction to the lnd assumptions, and so can Mycin if the rule str�ngth is less than its prior. Under these circumstances alternative assumptions can lead to qualitatively quite different behavior.
The maximum entropy prin ciple
Any assumptions, such as those discussed above, of correlation or absence of correlation imply additional information that has not in fact been given. So in general they have no basis. One approach to this problem is to explicitly minimize the additional in formation implied by choosing the prior distribution that maximizes entropy subject to the constraints of the specified rule-strengths and probabilities. Essentially the maximum entropy distribution makes the weakest possible assumptions consistent with the specified knowledge. Similarly, when additional information is obtained on a specific case, the prior can be updated to incorporate it by minimizing the cross-entropy (MXE) between the prior and posterior distributions.
Cross-entropy is a measure of how much information one would have to receive to change one distribution into another 1 • Shore and Johnson (Shore and Johnson, 1980) have proved that this MXE approach has several very desirable properties. It produces a unique result that is invariant under any one-to one transformation of the co-ordinate system for specifying events, and under changes in between equivalent forms for specifying the joint distribution of pairs of independent events and subsystems. Any other method for filling in the 1 Thus, although Zadeh criticizes UIS's other than FTS for "assuming away" missing or ambiguous data, the FST algorithms he advocates are operationally equivalent to making stronger assumptions than necessary, by virtue of the fact that they give different results than the minimum cross entropy, or minimum assumption, method.
distributions, subject to linear constraints (such as rule· and data-strengths). and which satisfies these weak and highly desirable conditions would give the same results, and so ue identical in effect.
Of course, the estimate need not be computed via the general MXE calculation. Indeed, there are several important special cases: assuming independence when no correlation data is provided (a rule-strength is information on h . ow the antecedant and consequent are correlated), ordinary conditioning when probabilities are provided for disjoint events (including Bayes' Theorem). For rule-and data-strengths, the log linear model is formally quite similar, and has been used with.good results in several projects.
In sum ' mary, the use of other UIS gives results operationally equivalent · to using various assumptions within BOT, but by the above two arguments, MXE gives the only estimate consistent with BOT. Hence, using UIS which are not operationally equivalent to MXE will incur losses from violations of BOT. Using calculus of variations and simple numerical search algorithms, we can calculate the appropriate maximum entropy distributions for small problems quite simply, albeit slowly, and so are able to find the MXE conclusions as well as those of the other UIS, and so can compare them to assess how large or small the incurred -losses are.
Comparing UIS behavior for a simple rule
Probably the most typical form of rule in rule based systems is where a consequent is dependent on the conjunction of a set of antecedent propositions.
To obtain some insights into how various UIS's compare with each other and with the maximum entropy method (MEP}, it is useful to explore a simple rule with two antecedents.
We express the consequent, C as conditioned on the two antecedents, A and 8, as p(C/A&B) = p, and examine the behavior of p(C) as a function of p(A), p(B) and p.
In this case we will compare MEP, Mycin, FST and Ind. The FST assumes maximum correlation between A and 8, and A&B and C, in equations (1). Likewise lnd assumes independence between each pair.
The MEP method first calculates the prior distribution that maximizes entropy of the joint distribution p(A,B,C), subject to the given conditional probability, and then obtains the posterior distribution given the marginals p(A) and p(B), with minimum cross entropy to the prior. For a fair comparison Mycin uses the same priors as the MEP distribution, but updates them using Mycin combination rules. symmetrically and so p(A) and p(B) could be interchanged.) In all cases lnd is very similar to MEP (and so is largely obscured by it in the graphs). The methods are most similar for large p{A) and p(B), having similar slope with respect to p for p(A)>.5, p(B)>.5 as in Figure 5 . In all three cases FST gives the lowest probability p(C), but the largest slope with respect top and to p{A). Note that FST gives a positive slope with respect to p(A) for p<0.5, and p(A)<p(B), as in figure 7 , even when all other methods give p(A) negative slope. As illustrated in Figure 6 , Mycin, unlike the others, can give a negative slope with respect to p. implying that the stronger the rule the less likely the consequent. This happens for all p(A)<p o fAJ. Note that if the priors are all very small. as may be true in some applications, then the Mycin certainty factors and rule strengths will remain positive, and hence this counter intuitive behavior will be avoided. But in general both FST and Mycin can behave in qualitatively different fashion to the other methods.
Rul• strength -----------· ···· · · · ······· ··· ----

A problem with Dempster Shaler Theory
The definition of Dempster-Shafer Belief functions suggests an obvious correspondence with probability, with the Belief functions providing upper and lower limits on the probability. But Shafer resists this in terpretation, · and in fact it turns out that the results of making this correspondence are trivial. This arises from an unexpected consequence of the definition of the belief function. To explain this we must first give a m_ ore formal definition.
In general, Shafer utilizes four objects to derive a· belief function: Two frames of reference, S and T, each of which contains a set of basic events and all its possible subsets, a probability distribu!i � � over t�e basic events in �· p 8 , and a compattbthty relatton C such that set tff s can be true in S simultaneous with t being true in T. For sE aCS and t ETC T, Shafer defines a belief in -r via (4) -
Bel(-r)=ps{sf(\1 tXsCt-+ IE -r)} (4)
Let us now consider an interesting special case of DST, by returning to Shafer's "icy" example. Let s 1 = "Fred was careful and honest", �2 =:' . "Fre� .
was carele � s·: , . t 1 ="streets are not rcy , t 2.. = streets are ICY ; we know p(s 1 ) = 0.8, p(s 2 ) = u.2, and s 1 and t are incompatible. The compatability relation between S and T is shown in figure 8 , along with p 8 . We know that Psr must have the form given, but without more data a naive Bayesian could not calculate a precise value for tx. Let us consider, however, that there is a remote possibility of (s 1 &t2) happeningFred misheard the question, we misheard the answer, it has since cooled, or something else. This gives figure 9 The new Bel function gives DST( {t1}) = [0,0], DST( {t 2 }) = (0,0], DST( {t 1 ,t � J) = [1,0], no matter how small {3 is. This discontinuous h sensitivity to Ps suggests that ignoring "negligable events T. will generally have radical effects. 
Bel(T)= (5)
Ps{ �(V' t)(ps1{tls)>O--+ t E r)} Bel(r)=max Pfa), s.t/1/ sEa )(p 5 j,.ls) = 1)
Suppose �hat .
Psr does not . definitively rule out any combrnatron of s. and t., 1.e. PsT·SxT--+ (0,1).
Then the only r wh \ ch is 1 guara n teed, for any
clearly a tight lower bound on Pr(T), whiSh can, but usually will not, be acheivei:l. In everyday terms, this extreme conservativism requires us to completely ignore whatever anyone says, unless we literally believe them to be infallible. In the military application of processing sensor data, all data would be ignored, because individually each sensor is fallible, and there is even a remote chance that all will fail simultaneously. But ignoring reports of incoming missiles is very likely to be fatal.
Clearly, this is ridiculous, and any expert who treated improbable events equally . with the probable ones would perform quite poorly. As a Bayesian, one can show that the expected cost of ignoring possible events declines smoothly toward zero as their probability de�lines toward zero. Indeed, knowing p(t 2 js 1 )<1o · 0 in figure 9 would surely be enough to justify ignoring the possibility of (t 2 &s ., ), and there is no need to seek a precise numoer. But to avoid using such' estimates about correlations between the S and T frames was Shafer's aim, and so the Bayesians' way of handling Bel's discontinuous dependence on esr is inadmissable. Of course, if we do use 1:1ayesian reasoning to jusfjy ignoring improbable events and weak correlations, then the problem becomes one of bounding · or sensitivity-analysis within BOT, not on e of OST versus BOT.
Evaluating results differences in Given some method for tranforrning the conclusions of non-probabilistic UIS's to be: commensurable with probabilities, we need some way to evaluate the importance of the differences between results.
If we had an explicit utility function for deci sions based on the output of the inference system, then we could simply calculate the expected loss in utility for using suboptimal inference methods.
But in practice explicit utility functions are often hard to come by. So we propose to use both mean absolute enor and mean squared error, on the grounds of simplicity and also because of their consistency with plausible classes of· utility function.
No rmalizing error estimates A difficulty arises in comparing performance on different cases in that they are likely allow differen t ranges of error. For example, if we randomly guess at the probability of 0.5, it is impossible to be off by more than 0.5, but if we guess the probability of an almost certain event (probability 0 or 1 ) , then it is possible to be off by almost 1. An error near .5 is almost the worst possible in the former case, but is about average for the second. So it is useful define normalized performance measures, which compare estimates to random guesses, and the worst possible results. The worst possible estimate of p is max(p, 1·p). We can define the random guess value as the expected error, if the estimate were uniformly distributed over the estimator's domain. 
DST:
(2(ti + p 02) + Q-4 pp 0) / (4Q),
(10) (11) The normalized measures rescale the errors to give 1 for zero error, 0 when as good as random guessing, and· ·1 for the worst possible, with linear interpolation in between. The normalized absolute error, is given by piecewise linear interpolation between:
The normalized squared f ror, f is defined similar!y wit� mid-point p.(e ), and worst value max (p ,(1-p) ).
Comparing performance on an example rule-set All considerations given above come together in the framework diagrammed in figure 10 . The experiment begins with a collection of rules, R, stated as conditional probabilities of consequents given antecedants, and prior probabilities. In this example, the rules allow inferences about the probabilities of four different kinds of nuclear reactor accidents. Aside from the conditional probabilities of accidents given symptoms, it seems plausible to include a rule that the probability of no accident is quite small, since the system would not be used unless alarms had sounded -but false alarms are possible. These rules are taken to be a general description of the domain. as opposed to the case-specific data, D, which describes which particular alarms and symptoms a particular accident caused. The MEP prior, p 0 , is estimated by maximizing entropy subject to the rules R. This prior is then updated using minimum cross-entropy, by D to yield the posterior p 1, from which the probabilities of various accident types (i.e. the conclusions) may be read. R and D are also converted to whatever strengths the current UIS uses, giving R' and D', which might be a collection of Mycin rule strengths and CF's. The UIS is then used to propagate the D' using the rules. R', to obtain the strengths for the conclusions, C', which are then converted back to probabilities, p' 1, and compa,red to p 1 .
Figure 10: Basic Experiment Design it is important . to note . that p 1 !s estimated in two stages, by usmg R wtth max1mum entropy and using D and p 0 with minimum cross entropy, rather than using RUD with maximum entropy. To see why, consider a case where one rule is "given swollen belly and sickness in morning, there is .a 40% chance ot pregnancy", and . another is "given male-ness, there is a 0% chance of pregnancy". The data is that the patient has a swollen belly. is sick in the morning, and is a male. Whatever our prior p0 is, if it is consistent with the two rules, then when it is updated with the data, it will give a probability of zero to pregnancy. Hence, in the posterior p 1, the probabilitY. of pregnancy given male-ness IS zero, not 40% 2 . It would be impossible to have the rules and the data both hold in one distribution, and if possible would lead to the wrong conclusion of a 40% chance that a male was pregnant.
The original rule incorporated the assumption that there was a significant chance of the patient being female, which is directly contradicted by the new data. If rules were conditioned on not just one or two propositions, but on every possible proposition, then they would include no assumptions about prior probabilities, and it would make no difference whether p1 was found in one step or two, or even conditioned several times by different D's along the way. The four conclusions are designated A, B. C. and D . , as in figure 11 .
We specified rule-strengths, varying from 70% to 95%. and added two new rules · that the probability of no accident was 1 %; and the probability of a single accident was 95%. Hence, there was a 4% of a multiple failure. It should be noted that these two rules induce certain other correlations , which might be expressed as a cyclic set of conditional probabilities, such as p(B!A)<0.04.
This set of 11 rules was used to form prior p as in figure 10 , which was then used with diftePent D's in four different tests. rather than di rectly about the poster i or. DST always did slightly worse than chance, because its error function is influenced both by the width and the off-centeredness of the estimate, and it always had the greatest possible width.
DST showed the pathology discussed earlier, and its poor results should be viewed in that light. Interestingly , by all four measures the performance on C was better than on I, for FST and MYC even though one would expect errors to compound and performance to deteriorate as we propagate strengths farther.
Final remarks
Detailed analysis of the behavior of a single rule in isolation, as outlined in the first part of the paper, can give some insights into the differences In behavior between UIS's and the conditions under which they differ, qual itatively and quantitatively. However the ultimate impact of these differences within a system of many rules depends on aggregate characteristics of the system.
To understand these we must explore wider clases of rule sets, both experimentally and analytically to understand the results.
The experimental observations presented, being based on only four different tests using one rule set, are primarily illustrative. There are obviously many interesting lines of research open at this point . using a wider variety of rule-sets, other UIS's, using other methods of correspondence between probabilities and non-probabilistic UIS's, including perhaps a fairer test of DST, and so on. The main purpose of this paper is to present and and try to justify a framework for t8sting the accuracy of UIS's results, ignoring for the moment issues of computational effort, clarity. or simpl icity. 
